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Farmer distress is in the news again. The causes of distress may be many - ranging from
low productivity on small and marginal farms, crop failure due to weather fluctuations, to
low market price due to a bumper harvest. The usual policy response, however, seems to
be a loan-waiver announcement. For example, several loan-waivers were announced in the
second half of 2017. The stated rationale for loan-waivers is that if debt burdens are
alleviated in this one instance, then it provides consumption relief and makes it possible to
start the next farming season in a clean state. The assumption seems to be that the
problems that caused distress this season, will somehow, not manifest themselves again.
Even if one were to believe that a one-time loan-waiver is a solution to problems of agrarian
distress, the efficacy of the mechanism depends on its implementation. This article makes
the case that it is possible, and even desirable, that the process of loan-waivers be handled
through procedures in the personal insolvency sections of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The Code which became functional for corporates last year has
still not been made available for individuals. Implementing loan waivers through the IBC
1/5
would essentially mean that the decision to avail a loan waiver would cease to be a
"political decision" applicable to the collective of farmers, and become an "individual's
decision".
Why is mass scale loan-waivers a bad idea?
Ad-hoc loan waiver announcements are usually politically motivated. Their implementation
leaves a lot to be desired. For example, a CAG report has demonstrated large-scale
mismanagement in a previous loan waiver scheme. By December 2017, stories had
surfaced about implementation issues in Maharashtra. In January this year, the Punjab
government launched its loan-waiver scheme even as farmers protested alleging
irregularities in the selection of beneficiaries.
Large-scale loan-waivers create moral hazard problems which are detrimental to the
development of a credit culture. If debtors expect that there will be a loan-waiver
announcement in the future, then there is little incentive to repay on time, as has been
demonstrated by empirical research (Kanz, 2016, Chakraborty and Gupta, 2017).
Anecdotes suggest that loan-waivers have contagion effects on other sources of credit
such as micro-finance. Lenders (other than public sector banks that are forced to lend
through priority sector lending targets) become wary of venturing into these markets making
borrowers more credit constrained. Credit becomes more expensive for everyone and not
just those who benefited from the waiver.
Waivers also have fiscal consequences - money spent on waivers is not spent on
measures that may improve agricultural productivity in the long run. For the costs they
impose in terms of the fisc as well as the poor development of credit markets, their
benefits seem uncertain. It is not clear who is benefiting from the loan waivers, and whether
intended beneficiaries are actually getting the waivers.
Personal insolvency in the IBC
Before we study how waivers would be handled through the IBC, it is useful to understand
the processes of personal insolvency in the Code. The IBC has an entire section on
personal insolvency which consists of three processes, two of which are similar to that in
corporate insolvency. This includes the Insolvency Resolution Process (IRP) wherein the
debtor who defaults on loan repayment, proposes an alternate repayment plan to her
creditors, and subsequently gets a discharge from her debts. The second is the Bankruptcy
Process (BP), wherein the non-exempt assets of the debtor are liquidated to pay off her
creditors, leading to a discharge.
Once the personal insolvency sections of the IBC are notified, it would become possible for
farmers to approach the courts to ask for a re-negotiation of their debts from their lenders
through the IRP. Such a demand may be made by creditors as well. If the IRP fails, farmers
could undergo the bankruptcy process. Both these processes do not include an element of
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a waiver. It is expected that the debtor will make some repayments to the creditor - either
through a repayment plan that most likely promises payments out of future wage (or other)
income or through liquidation of the non-exempt personal assets. Such a system disciplines
borrowers and brings difficult questions on the feasibility of a particular venture, including
low productivity farming, to the forefront. The process also disciplines creditors by
constraining them from forceful credit recovery, and by bringing them to the table to re-
negotiate with the debtor, and take a haircut on their loans.
Debt relief in the IBC
The third process, called Fresh Start, aims to provide debt-relief to people who fall below
certain asset, income and debt thresholds. The eligible debtor, in this case, the farmer, can
trigger this process. On acceptance of the farmer's petition, her debts will be waived off.
That is, the creditors will not be able to initiate a recovery process on this debt, and will
have to do a write-off. A record of default will be kept by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Board of India (IBBI) for a certain prescribed time-period, and future creditors will have
access to these facts. Thus, the fresh start process provides a full waiver to the farmer,
while containing moral hazard through a record of default. The decision on whether to avail
of the waiver rests with the individual.
Why a fresh start?
One may wonder why a fresh start at all. If loan waivers are expected to create moral
hazard problems, then why make provisions for such a process? There are two good
reasons for allowing complete debt relief.
Very often the costs of going through an insolvency resolution process or a
bankruptcy may be higher than the amount that can be expected to be collected. In
such an event it is more efficient for the system to just write-off those loans.
Bankruptcy systems often provide an element of social insurance, as it is believed
that distress can be the result of circumstances beyond one's control. In the case of
personal insolvency, especially, studies in the US have shown that events such as
medical emergencies account for a number of financial distress cases. In such
circumstances, it might be optimal to provide a mechanism to discharge one's debt
without undergoing a resolution process. The provision of insurance might actually
encourage households to take debt and engage in entrepreneurial ventures. This
may be true of farmers who may be in distress due to events such as crop failure and
may wish to avail of a write-off of their debts.
Why is the fresh start better than a loan-waiver?
The fresh start process is superior to the loan-waiver programs as it offers a more
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systematic way of resolving distress. Each farmer can weigh the trade-offs between
obtaining debt relief through the fresh start process, but potentially more expensive credit in
the future, versus offering a resolution plan or going through a bankruptcy process for a
better credit score. It thus contains the moral hazard problem and might yield better credit
markets.
As the application is made by the intended beneficiary, there will be a very little possibility
of the selective provision to beneficiaries, or leakages in the administration of the waiver
program. The application for a fresh start does not depend on the state government
declaring a loan-waiver scheme - it is possible to obtain this in the ordinary course of life. It
contains the fiscal problem as the state does not rush in to pay the banks for the loans that
have been waived. If the state government still wishes to pay for the waivers, then it can
always pay the banks, but use the IBC to actually implement it. In doing so, it still is able to
constrain the moral hazard problem as those who avail of waivers will have a record.
Challenges of implementing fresh start
The advantage of fresh start lies in formalizing the process of debt-waiver and putting the
decision in the hands of the farmers who can weigh the consequences of the decision. This
may sound simple in theory, but as with most things, may turn out to be difficult in practice
for the following reasons:
The rollout of the process rests on the institutional machinery of the IBC being in
place. This requires setting up new Debt Recovery Tribunals as well as improving
their procedure, and training of Resolution Professionals. Farmers in remote villages
need a way to access this institutional infrastructure. If the machinery is not in place,
then the existence of such a process is moot.
The decision to undergo a fresh start may be a complex if one is financially not very
savvy. This requires a cadre of credit counselors who work in the interest of the
debtors, in advising on the application process as well as on understanding the
substantive implications of the Code. There is currently no such cadre of "advisors"
who can guide farmers on these decisions.
As currently defined, the thresholds for a fresh start eligibility are rather narrow. Only
debtors with gross annual income of less than Rs.60,000, assets less than
Rs.20,000, debts less than Rs.35,000, and no home-ownership are eligible to get a
complete waiver of debts. It is not clear how many farmers will qualify for a fresh start
under these conditions. It might be useful for the government to revisit these
thresholds in light of how important fresh start may be for solving the problem of loan
distress in India.
In an environment where lending to agriculture is politically motivated (see Cole,
2009), large-scale use of fresh start might get the banks in further trouble - as on one
hand they will be forced to write off these loans, but on the other also forced to lend
to farmers through priority sector lending requirements. For the fresh start
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mechanism to work, we need to move towards a more thorough-going reform in
public sector banking in general and agricultural credit in particular.
Conclusion
Indian agriculture seems to repeatedly encounter large-scale agrarian distress. In this
environment, the proclivity to announcing farm loan waivers, the inability of waivers to
reach intended beneficiaries, while causing adverse consequences on credit culture
suggests that we find more efficient ways of resolving this distress. Enacting the personal
insolvency sections of the Indian Bankruptcy Code may be a useful mechanism to address
this problem. In particular, the provisions on a fresh start, which provide a complete waiver
of debts, may be extremely useful in providing relief to farmers in a systematic way, and by
confronting the problem of loan write-offs, may pave the way for reform in agricultural
lending.
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